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The hydraulics of constitutional claims:  
Multiplicity of actors in constitutional interpretation 
 
Athanasios Psygkas 
 
[Forthcoming in 69 University of Toronto Law Journal __ (2019)] 
 
I. Introduction. 
Who interprets the Constitution? Conventional accounts have attempted to address this 
question by focusing either on the political1 or the legal constitution2 and stressing the respective 
roles of Parliament or the courts. Newer, more nuanced proposals aim at overcoming this strict 
distinction and approach the constitution as a mixed model.3 Yet another interesting strand in the 
literature presents the relationship between Parliament and the courts as a constitutional dialogue.4   
This article aims to tell a new, richer story that involves many more actors. Even the 
dialogic constitutional theories often do not go so far as to recognize the significance of other 
actors of constitutional interpretation beyond Parliament and the courts. In a similar vein, the focus 
of constitutional theory in continental Europe has been traditionally on constitutional courts. By 
                                                 
 Lecturer in Law, University of Bristol. I wish to thank the participants at the Constitutional Roundtable at the 
University of Toronto Faculty of Law, the European Junior Faculty Forum at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center, 
and the Legal and Political Theory Workshop at the National University of Ireland, Galway, for their questions and 
suggestions. I am very grateful to Brenda Cossman, Eoin Daly, David Dyzenhaus, Michaela Hailbronner, Steven 
Hoffman, Lisa Kelly, Christoph Möllers, Donncha O’Connell, Mariana Mota Prado, Tony Prosser, Julian Rivers, 
David Schneiderman, Ioanna Tourkochoriti, Renáta Uitz, and two anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments 
on this project. 
1 J.A.G. Griffith, “The Political Constitution” (1979) 42 Mod L Rev 1; J.A.G. Griffith, “The Common Law and the 
Political Constitution” (2001) 117 Law Q Rev 42. 
2 Stephen Sedley, “The Sound of Silence: Constitutional Law Without a Constitution” (1994) 110 Law Q Rev 270. 
3 Graham Gee & Grégoire Webber, “What is a Political Constitution?’ (2010) 30 Oxford J of Legal Stud 273 at 292 
(“Britain’s constitution today embraces, perhaps in uncertain ways and to an uncertain extent, both a political model 
and a legal model”); Adam Tomkins, “What’s Left of the Political Constitution?” (2013) 14 German LJ 2275 at 2292 
(“the political and the legal of the constitution can and should be mixed. I do not want to go back to the political 
constitution”). 
4 See the seminal article by Peter W. Hogg and Allison A. Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue between Courts and 
Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal 75. In the UK literature there have been different accounts of constitutional dialogue; see, e.g., Francesca 
Klug, “The Human Rights Act--a ‘third way’ or ‘third wave’ Bill of Rights” (2001) Eur HRL Rev 361; Danny Nicol, 
“Law and Politics After the Human Rights Act” (2006) Public Law 722; Tom Hickman, “Constitutional Dialogue, 
Constitutional Theories and the HRA 1998” (2005) Public Law 306; Alison L Young, Democratic Dialogue and the 
Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). See also Stephen Gardbaum, “The New Commonwealth Model 
of Constitutionalism” (2001) 49 Am J Comp L 707 (even though in his later book with the same title Gardbaum 
explains that he has become skeptical of the term “dialogue”; Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of 
Constitutionalism: Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 15). 
 2 
contrast, in the United States, recent scholarship indicates an intellectual shift toward - or, more 
accurately, a renewed interest in - extrajudicial constitutional interpretation.5 This has taken the 
form of either “departmentalism,” which emphasizes the role of the other branches of government 
in constitutional interpretation or “popular constitutionalism,” which highlights the role of the 
people (especially through social movements) in shaping constitutional meaning.6 
Against this backdrop, I argue that multiple actors play a role in raising, and resolving, 
constitutional claims on both sides of the Atlantic.7 These actors may include ordinary lower courts 
(at the federal or state level), foreign and international courts, the executive (broadly defined to 
include not only the President or the government but also administrative authorities), local and 
regional authorities, and, crucially, the people themselves. There are common functional demands 
for bottom-up democratic involvement in elaborating constitutional principles in various systems. 
This is “democratic constitutionalism” in action: societal actors leverage constitutional law to 
make legal and policy claims.8 These claims respond to what is described in this article as a 
“hydraulic process.” In the science of hydraulics, force applied to an incompressible fluid at one 
point of the system is transmitted to another point in the system. The fluid does not disappear but 
is channeled through a different avenue. The hydraulics metaphor has been employed in other 
contexts, notably in accounts of campaign finance reform, discretion in the criminal justice system, 
and constitutional reform.9 In the context of this article, the hydraulics analogy explains how, 
                                                 
5 Tommaso Pavone, “Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: A Review of Two Approaches” (November 2014) 
[on file with author] 
6 Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Larry 
D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004). 
7 The idea of institutional multiplicity is well-established in other disciplines, including organizational theory, political 
science, and sociology; see W. Richard Scott, “Institutions and organizations: Toward a theoretical synthesis”, in W. 
Richard Scott & John W. Meyer, eds., Institutional Environments and Organizations: Structural Complexity and 
Individualism (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1994) 55 at 75-76; Elisabeth S. Clemens and James M. Cook, 
“Politics and Institutionalism: Explaining Durability and Change” (1999) 25 Annual Review of Sociology 441; 
Lindsey D. Carsona & Mariana Mota Prado, “Using Institutional Multiplicity to Address Corruption as a Collective 
Action Problem: Lessons from the Brazilian Case” (2016) 62 The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 56. 
This article will demonstrate that institutional multiplicity is well-suited to describing the dynamic nature of 
constitutional interpretation. 
8 I draw here on Robert Post & Reva Siegel, “Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash” (2007) 42 Harv 
CR-CLL Rev 373 at 374 (noting that “[t]he premise of democratic constitutionalism is that the authority of the 
Constitution depends on its democratic legitimacy . . . sustained by traditions of popular engagement that authorize 
citizens to make claims about the Constitution’s meaning”). Post and Siegel add that democratic constitutionalism 
“analyzes the practices employed by citizens and government officials to reconcile [the] potentially conflicting 
commitments [to the rule of law and to self-governance]” (ibid at 375). 
9 On campaign finance reform, see Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, “The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance 
Reform” (1999) 77 Tex L Rev 1705 at 1705, 1708 (noting “the First Law of Political Thermodynamics—the desire 
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across various constitutional systems, similar bottom-up constitutional claims are asserted in 
different institutional forums. The common driver is the grassroots mobilization of societal actors 
(and their opponents) advancing their interpretation of the constitution through all available 
avenues. The precise configuration of these institutional channels is the result of “hydraulic shifts”: 
when societal actors are forced out of one institutional channel, they redirect their constitutional 
claims to alternative forums thereby engaging new institutional actors. To continue with the 
hydraulics analogy, these constitutional claims do not disappear. Instead, as they are “compressed” 
out of one institutional channel, they are diverted toward another. These dynamic hydraulic 
responses ultimately generate a picture of multiple institutional actors engaging in the process of 
constitutional interpretation.  
I map out these constitutional actors by using as a case study the legal recognition of same-
sex marriage in the United States, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Ireland. The article adopts a 
historical institutionalist approach focusing on the complex institutional dynamics that illustrate 
how the map of multiple constitutional actors emerges in the four countries.10 These four systems 
were selected because they exemplify distinctive models of recognizing same-sex marriage 
formally, with different actors taking the lead and appearing to have the final say on this contested 
issue.11 Furthermore, the selection of cases representing different cultures, legal traditions, and 
                                                 
for political power cannot be destroyed, but at most, channeled into different forms” and arguing that “political money, 
like water, has to go somewhere. It never really disappears into thin air”). More recent literature has drawn on this 
analogy, see, e.g., Michael S. Kang, “The Hydraulics and Politics of Party Regulation” (2005) 91 Iowa L. Rev. 131 
(discussing the broader “hydraulics of party regulation”); Michael S. Kang, “The End of Campaign Finance Law” 
(2012) 98 Va L Rev 1 at 5 (referring to a “reverse hydraulics” phenomenon whereby “the removal of longstanding 
restrictions on independent expenditures is causing money rapidly to return to the least regulated, least restricted 
pathways”); Sarah C. Haan, “The CEO and the Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Deregulation” (2014) 109 Nw UL 
Rev 269 at 275 (referring to “the hydraulics of campaign finance de-regulation”); Anthony Johnstone, “The System 
of Campaign Finance Disclosure” (2014) 98 Iowa L Rev Bull 143 at 147 (suggesting that “campaign speech itself is 
subject to hydraulic effects across a regime of disclosure rules”). On the “hydraulic effects” in the criminal justice 
system, see Candace McCoy, “Determinate Sentencing, Plea Bargaining Bans, and Hydraulic Discretion in 
California” (1984) 9 Justice System Journal 256; Terance D. Miethe, “Charging and Plea Bargaining Practices Under 
Determinate Sentencing: An Investigation of the Hydraulic Displacement of Discretion” (1987) 78 J Crim L & 
Criminology 155; William J. Stuntz, “The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law” (2001) 100 Mich L Rev 505; Sonja 
B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, “Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the 
Effects of Booker” (2013) 123 Yale LJ 2. On the hydraulics metaphor in the example of constitutional reform, see 
Heather K. Gerken, “The Hydraulics of Constitutional Reform: A Skeptical Response to Our Undemocratic 
Constitution” (2007) 55 Drake L Rev 925. 
10 Earlier work along these lines has suggested that “public policies are shaped by the structure of political institutions 
and by the legacies of past policies” (Miriam Smith, Political Institutions and Lesbian and Gay Rights in the United 
States and Canada (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008) at 8). 
11 The article focuses on the formal recognition of same-sex marriage in the different country cases. However, the path 
toward legalization of same-sex marriage generally included, at earlier stages, a gradual recognition of other gay rights 
- commonly the decriminalization of intimate relations and the introduction of civil partnerships for same-sex couples. 
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background constitutional structures brings to the fore not only the different models of legalizing 
same-sex marriage but also significant commonalities that have been understudied in the literature. 
The case studies illustrate that common bottom-up constitutional demands respond to similar 
overarching hydraulic processes, which, in turn, owing to diverse political, institutional, and 
cultural contexts, bring in the voices of citizens and other constitutional actors in diverse ways.  
The case studies also highlight relevant background institutional features in the process of 
legalizing same-sex marriage. The United States seems to reflect a court-centric approach, with 
same-sex marriage ultimately recognized nationally in the 2015 Supreme Court case of Obergefell 
v. Hodges.12 However, the picture within a federal system is more complex than what a single 
judicial incident might suggest at first sight. This outcome was the culmination of a national 
conversation going back to at least the early 1990s and involving multiple actors: social 
movements, the electorate, state courts and legislatures, lower federal courts, and the US Supreme 
Court itself. The Supreme Court had strategically joined the national debate at different points in 
cases leading up to Obergefell (Part II). In Spain, recognition came through a 2005 statute which, 
in a rather unusual turn, was then challenged before the Constitutional Court. Again, the picture is 
more complicated than the model “statute-judicial affirmation” suggests, with important 
institutional actors such as autonomous communities, political parties, and the people directly 
entering into this national conversation prior to and in the Constitutional Court decision (Part III). 
The UK model appears even more straightforward with statutory recognition in 2013 (England 
and Wales) and 2014 (Scotland), and no judicial affirmation. Compared to the other two examples, 
judicial involvement in this case has been less pronounced, with key cases pertaining to cohabiting 
same-sex partners and civil partnerships. However, again, this account should not overlook the 
role of actors beyond Parliament and the Supreme Court. Furthermore, devolution is an important 
                                                 
These usual milestones are considered briefly in the historical analysis of the cases as the movement for equal marriage 
often built on these earlier cases. Another comparative study of gay rights similarly focuses on decriminalization of 
sexual acts, recognition of same-sex couples as “families,” same-sex marriage, and parental rights, see Angioletta 
Sperti, Constitutional Courts, Gay Rights and Sexual Orientation Equality (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017) at 4-7. Of 
course, as the case studies will also suggest, the move toward LGBT equality has not been a straightforward linear 
process. There has been strong resistance, backlash, and setbacks along the way. Furthermore, the decriminalization 
of same-sex intimate relations did not address fully the vulnerability of the LGBT communities in their encounters 
with the criminal justice system; see, e.g., Timothy Stewart-Winter, “Queer Law and Order: Sex, Criminality, and 
Policing in the Late Twentieth-Century United States” (2015) 102 Journal of American History 61 at 69-71; Elias 
Walker Vitulli, “Queering the Carceral: Intersecting Queer/Trans Studies and Critical Prison Studies” (2012) 19 GLQ: 
A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 111; Joey L. Mogul, Andrea J. Ritchie & Kay Whitlock, Queer (In)justice: The 
Criminalization of LGBT People in the United States (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2011). 
12 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015) [Obergefell]. 
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institutional factor in the hydraulic processes identified in the UK case (Part IV). In Ireland, the 
ordinary legislative path for the recognition of same-sex marriage was closed off because of 
concerns about a potential judicial invalidation. With the legislative and judicial paths removed 
from the table, popular mobilization was directly channeled into constitutional reform through a 
referendum (Part V). Part VI draws comparative conclusions and outlines normative 
considerations that flow from the new paradigm proposed in the article. 
 
II. The United States. 
The United States, probably the most familiar case, provides a helpful backdrop against 
which to situate the discussion of the three case studies from Europe in the following sections. 
Firstly, the United States would appear to present a clear example of a court-centric approach with 
the US Supreme Court being the key actor in the national recognition of same-sex marriage. 
However, the United States is also the system in which the theories of popular and democratic 
constitutionalism13 were developed as more nuanced accounts that challenge such court-centric 
approaches. Secondly, beginning the discussion of case studies with the US suggests that this is 
only one model of democratic constitutionalism and sets the stage for the alternative models in 
Spain, the United Kingdom, and Ireland.14 
At first sight, the federal recognition of same-sex marriage in the United States could be 
viewed as an example of legal constitutionalism: in the widely-anticipated Obergefell judgment, 
the US Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution requires states 
to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.15 This was in response to the federal legislature’s 
silence or outright opposition to the possibility of recognizing same-sex unions in the 1990s and 
2000s.16 In a hydraulics fashion, recognizing that the federal legislative avenue for recognition 
                                                 
13 For the differences between popular and democratic constitutionalism, see Post & Siegel, supra note 8 at 379 (noting 
that their model of democratic constitutionalism recognizes the “essential role” of both “judicially enforced 
constitutional rights” and “public engagement . . . in guiding and legitimating the institutions and practices of judicial 
review”). 
14 Therefore, this section does not present an exhaustive history of the development of LGBT rights in the US. Such a 
detailed account would be beyond the scope of this article and is available in other works, some of which are cited in 
the footnotes of this section. Instead, as noted previously, I focus on certain milestones that illustrate the multiplicity 
of constitutional actors. 
15 Obergefell, supra note 12. 
16 Indeed, the US Congress’s hostility to such demands took concrete forms through the enactment of the Defense of 
Marriage Act in 1996 and the consideration of the Federal Marriage Amendment, both of which are discussed later in 
the text. 
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across all fifty states was not feasible, the LGBT movement directed its energy to individual states 
and courts (state courts first, federal courts at later stages). The success of the equal marriage 
movement is striking, particularly if placed against the backdrop of the treatment of same-sex 
relations in the preceding decades. For instance, as Michael Klarman has noted, in the 1970s courts 
would not only dismiss legal arguments in favour of same-sex marriage summarily; they would 
often treat them with derision.17 
 Therefore, the story of equal marriage in the US involves multiple actors at both the state 
and federal levels. Interestingly, we can glean the operation of these multiple forces even by 
focusing on the federal judiciary, thus complicating the picture of legal constitutionalism. 
Obergefell was the culmination of a series of cases before the US Supreme Court. Certain 
milestones in the history of these cases demonstrate how the Supreme Court through its reasoning 
both reflected and contributed to the national conversation and contestation (even conflict) outside 
the courts.18 For instance, in the 2003 case of Lawrence v. Texas,19 at issue was a Texas statute 
that criminalized sexual relations between consenting adults of the same-sex. The statute was sex-
specific, prohibiting same-sex, but not different-sex sodomy. Therefore, the traditional equal 
protection argument was readily available.20 However, in a majority opinion written by Justice 
Kennedy, the Court struck down the statute on liberty grounds. It held that the statute violated the 
fundamental right of all persons - regardless of sexual orientation - to control their intimate sexual 
relations. Interestingly, Justice Kennedy used a dignity argument as well, which was based in 
liberty. He wrote: “[A]dults may choose to enter upon this [personal] relationship in the confines 
of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. . . . The 
liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.”21 
Therefore, Lawrence was primarily a case about liberty with clear dignity undertones.  
Why would the majority’s preferred grounds be liberty and not equality? Two answers 
could be suggested. First, the “liberty path” emphasizes what all citizens have in common as 
human beings. Kenji Yoshino invites us to consider the choice of the majority in Lawrence in the 
following way. How do these two claims sound? 
                                                 
17 Michael Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar: Courts, Backlash, and the Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013) at 17-21. 
18 Reva B. Siegel, “Foreword: Equality Divided” (2013) 127 Harv L Rev 1. 
19 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) [Lawrence]. 
20 Kenji Yoshino, “The New Equal Protection” (2011) 124 Harv L Rev 747. 
21 Lawrence, supra note 19 at 567. 
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(1) “Gays should have the right to marry because straights have the right to marry and gays are 
equal to straights;”  
(2) “All adults should have the right to marry the person they love.”22 
The equality claim (claim 1) invites contemplation on what divides groups, what differentiates or 
not gay and straight people. It might, therefore, be “prone to sounding like a ‘special rights’ 
argument, especially to those who associate group-based civil rights with a culture of complaint.” 
The liberty claim (claim 2), Yoshino continues, is more likely to sound like a universalist “human 
rights” argument, pointing to what all people have in common universally.23 This may, in turn, 
increase the rhetorical force of the argument and be more persuasive to the segment of the 
population that is in the middle of this debate. However, there is a powerful counter-argument: 
“Even as the liberty paradigm pushes towards universalism, it seems to require members of the 
LGBT community to litigate pieces of their humanity, one by one. First, they assert their right as 
human beings to have intimate relations with another person. Then they assert the right to marry 
or to have a family. To work. To serve their country.”24 
A related account, which is particularly relevant for the purposes of this article, points to 
the Court’s concern with the reach of a potential equality decision.25 Robert Post has similarly 
observed that an equality ruling would have probably required the Court to hold that statutes 
prohibiting same-sex sex were impermissible classifications based upon sexual orientation. This, 
in turn, could have rendered “constitutionally suspicious all state laws that [discriminated] based 
upon sexual orientation, including those dealing with marriage.”26 Because Lawrence went for the 
liberty option, it needed not make any sweeping pronouncements that would cover statutes in other 
domains.27 These advantages were considerable, because they enabled the Court to enter into the 
national debate about the status of gay rights in a limited and strategic way—only as far as intimate 
relations were concerned, but not same-sex marriage or other issues. Thus, the Court preserved its 
                                                 
22 Yoshino, supra note 20 at 793-94. 
23 Ibid at 794. 
24 Heather Gerken, “Larry and Lawrence” (2007) 42 Tulsa L Rev 843 at 851. 
25 Pamela S. Karlan, “Foreword: Loving Lawrence” (2004) 102 Mich L Rev 1447 at 1459. 
26 Robert Post, “Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law” (2003) 117 Harv L Rev 4 at 
99-100. 
27 Writing in the aftermath of Lawrence, Robert Post argued that “due process analysis may be more far-reaching than 
equal protection analysis, because the framework of due process does not have to work through the doctrinal thicket 
of facial classifications, disparate impact, and discriminatory purpose (Post, ibid at 104n.88). However, the Court 
hedged the implications of the liberty analysis by emphasizing that protection was “within the private realm” (ibid at 
104).  
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options in deciding how far it was willing to go in the future. Lawrence has been therefore correctly 
described as the “opening bid” in a conversation that the Court expected to hold with the American 
public.28 There is another societal aspect here: By 2003, only thirteen states still criminalized 
consensual sodomy. In the seventeen years between Bowers (which had upheld the criminalization 
of same-sex sex) and Lawrence, Americans had gone from opposing the legalization of same-sex 
relations by 55% to 33% to supporting legalization by 60% to 35%. In this sense, Michael Klarman 
notes, Lawrence was an “easy case”: it involved the constitutionalization of a social norm that was 
already commanding overwhelming popular and state support.29 
However, some paths could have been more slippery. The Lawrence majority carefully 
disclaimed any implications of its decision for the question of same-sex marriage.30 The Texas 
statute, the majority said, seeks “to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to 
formal recognition in the law” - even the word “marriage” was avoided - it is “within the liberty 
of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.”31 Not all justices were convinced by 
this statement. Justice Scalia writing for the dissent said: “At the end of its opinion the Court says 
that the present case ‘does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to 
any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.’ Do not believe it.”32 And then he went 
on, “This case does not involve the issue of homosexual marriage only if one entertains the belief 
that principle and logic have nothing to do with the decisions of this Court.”33 
Who is Justice Scalia talking to when he says, “do not believe it”? It is not his colleagues. 
It is rather the public reading the opinion or the media reports on his dissent. As William Eskridge 
and John Ferejohn have noted, Justice Scalia’s audience was also Congress, which was considering 
a proposal for the Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA). Recognizing the “risk” of judicial 
intervention in the marriage debate (domestically and internationally), the FMA would have 
prohibited courts from interpreting the US Constitution or a state constitution to require the 
recognition of same-sex marriage. After Lawrence, President George W. Bush endorsed the FMA, 
                                                 
28 Ibid at 104-05. 
29 Klarman, supra note 17 at 85-86. 
30 Karlan, supra note 25 at 1459. 
31 Lawrence, supra note 19 at 567. 
32 Ibid at 604. 
33 Ibid at 605. 
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and the Republican Party made it a centerpiece of Bush’s socially conservative agenda in his 2004 
re-election campaign.34 
This raises the question of whether Justice Scalia was right to worry that the Court in 
Lawrence had opened the door for the future legalization of same-sex marriage. A pair of cases 
ten years later, Windsor and Perry35, would ask the Court to revisit these questions. Windsor 
concerned the constitutionality of Section 3 of a federal statute, the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA), which denied federal benefits to same-sex couples in states that allowed such unions. 
Again, Justice Kennedy, writing for a narrow majority, held:  
DOMA operates to deprive same-sex couples of the benefits and responsibilities 
that come with the federal recognition of their marriages. . . . The avowed purpose 
and practical effect of DOMA are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and 
so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the 
unquestioned authority of the States. The history of DOMA's enactment and its own 
text demonstrate that interference with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages, a 
dignity conferred by the States … was more than an incidental effect of the federal 
statute. It was its essence. . . . This requires the Court to hold, as it now does, that 
DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty of the person.36 
 
All three themes (equality, liberty, dignity) appear in this opinion. But dignity features 
more prominently in Windsor than in Lawrence. The word “dignity” itself appears three times in 
Lawrence, nine times in Windsor. As Reva Siegel explains, this rhetorical device is consciously 
employed to acknowledge the expressive function of the Court’s reasoning and the audience it 
addresses: In explaining its finding of unconstitutionality, “the Court emphasizes the message [that 
DOMA] communicates to people, what it ‘tells’ them. . . . This is an account of how people 
understand and experience the law . . . informed by long-running public debate--and by the 
experience and standpoint of the excluded.”37 
Once again, the Court trod carefully. The holding was that once a state had recognized a 
same-sex marriage, the federal government could not ignore this decision and deny federal 
benefits. However, Windsor did not require states that did not permit same-sex marriage to legalize 
                                                 
34 William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2010) at 372; Ellen Ann Andersen, Out of the Closets & into the Courts: Legal Opportunity 
Structure and Gay Rights Litigation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004) at 229-30. 
35 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 [Windsor]; Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 [Perry]. 
36 Windsor at 2693. 
37 Siegel, Foreword, supra note 18 at 90. 
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it. The majority concluded by noting that “this opinion and its holding are confined to those lawful 
marriages.”38 Once again, Justice Scalia was not convinced by this latest assurance:  
I have heard such ‘bald, unreasoned disclaimer[s]’ before. When the Court declared 
a constitutional right to homosexual sodomy [in Lawrence], we were assured that 
the case had nothing, nothing at all to do with “whether the government must give 
formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.” Now 
we are told that DOMA is invalid because it “demeans the couple, whose moral and 
sexual choices the Constitution protects”—with an accompanying citation of 
Lawrence. It takes real cheek for today’s majority to assure us, as it is going out the 
door, that a constitutional requirement to give formal recognition to same-sex 
marriage is not at issue here—when what has preceded that assurance is a lecture 
on how superior the majority's moral judgment in favor of same-sex marriage is to 
the Congress’s hateful moral judgment against it. I promise you this: The only thing 
that will “confine” the Court's holding is its sense of what it can get away with.39 
 
Interestingly, Justice Scalia’s dissent put forward an argument from democracy: “It is one 
thing for a society to elect change; it is another for a court of law to impose change by adjudging 
those who oppose it hostes humani generis, enemies of the human race.”40 This was picked up in 
Justice Alito’s dissent as well: “Our Nation is engaged in a heated debate about same-sex marriage. 
That debate is, at bottom, about the nature of the institution of marriage. Respondent Edith 
Windsor, supported by the United States, asks this Court to intervene in that debate, and although 
she couches her argument in different terms, what she seeks is a holding that enshrines in the 
Constitution a particular understanding of marriage under which the sex of the partners makes no 
difference. The Constitution, however, does not dictate that choice. It leaves the choice to the 
people, acting through their elected representatives at both the federal and state levels.”41 In other 
words, the dissenting justices would have closed off the judicial avenue and redirected Edith 
Windsor’s (and the LGBT movement’s) constitutional claims back to the legislative process. 
 Perry, the other 2013 case, would not confirm Justice Scalia’s worst fears quite yet. On 
November 4, 2008, 52% of California voters had adopted a ballot initiative called Proposition 8, 
or, more commonly known, Prop 8. Prop 8 had amended California’s Constitution to stipulate that 
“only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.” Two same-sex 
couples challenged the constitutionality of Prop 8 in federal court, and the case eventually reached 
                                                 
38 Windsor, supra note 35 at 2696. 
39 Ibid at 2709. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid at 2711.  
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the Supreme Court. A six-member majority opinion authored by the Chief Justice found that the 
litigants bringing the appeal before the Court, namely, the proponents of Prop 8, did not have a 
“particularized” interest sufficient to create a case or controversy. It was up to the state authorities 
to defend the amendment after it had been enacted. However, by the time the case had reached the 
Supreme Court, both the State Attorney General, Kamala Harris, and the Governor, Jerry Brown, 
had been elected on platforms promising not to defend the lawsuit.42 Therefore, Perry was a 
decision on standing grounds; the Court did not proceed to examine the substantive issue, namely 
the constitutionality of Prop 8. 
By not reaching the merits in Perry, the Court affirmed the decision of the lower federal 
court which had held that Prop 8 was unconstitutional. In this way, the Supreme Court effectively 
allowed same-sex marriages to continue in California but did not mandate legalization in all fifty 
states. The latter approach could have raised the specter of backlash. The “backlash hypothesis” 
suggests that, when courts draw on constitutional principles to produce significant social reforms, 
they can be counterproductive because they can instigate counter-mobilization from reinvigorated 
movements opposing these reforms.43 The US provides a number of historical examples. In 1993, 
the Hawaii Supreme Court in Baehr v. Lewin44 ruled that the exclusion of same-sex couples from 
the institution of marriage constituted gender classification and would thus trigger the most 
rigorous scrutiny under the state constitution. The mere prospect of same-sex marriage in Hawaii 
generated a robust response resulting in anti-gay legislation in other states45 and, at the national 
level, in the enactment of the Defense of Marriage Act in 1996,46 Section 3 of which was struck 
down in Windsor. Following a decision recognizing the right of same-sex couples to marry under 
the state constitution by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 2003 in Goodridge,47 
constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage passed in twenty-five states within five 
                                                 
42 Kris Perry & Sandy Stier, Love on Trial: Our Supreme Court Fight for the Right to Marry (Berkeley, CA: Roaring 
Forties Press, 2017) at 113. 
43 Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?, 2nd ed (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2008) at 425, 362, 368; Linda Greenhouse & Reva Siegel, “Backlash to the Future? From Roe to 
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44 74 Haw. 530, 852 P.2d 44. 
45 Defense-of-marriage laws were enacted in 22 states in 1996 and 1997. By 2001 the number of states with similar 
legislation had risen to 35 (Klarman, supra note 17 at 59). By 2006, forty-five states prohibited same-sex marriage by 
legislation, constitutional amendment or both (Rosenberg, supra note 43 at 365).  
46 Andersen, supra note 34 at 180. 
47 Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309, 798 N. E. 2d 941 (2003). 
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years.48 Goodridge also figured expressly in George W. Bush’s endorsement of the Federal 
Marriage Amendment.49 
 Drawing causal inferences that support the backlash hypothesis is difficult.50 Recent 
political science literature suggests that the backlash hypothesis is no longer borne out,51 and 
constitutional litigation has a lot to offer to the national debate about same-sex marriage.52 In a 
similar vein, legal scholars do not argue that adjudication cannot prompt backlash but that 
adjudication is not “distinctively more likely” than legislation to do so.53 However, this recognition 
did not necessarily alter the calculus of the justices in 2013. The pace of change in the public 
perception of LGBT rights had been very rapid. When the Court heard arguments in Perry in 
March 2013, same-sex marriage was permitted in nine states and the District of Columbia. In 
January 2015, the number was thirty-six. In terms of public opinion, Nate Silver has shown that 
opposition to marriage equality declined from almost 70% to 60% between 1996 and 2004 and fell 
under 50% in 2011 and 2012, while support rose between 1996 and 2004 and even exceeded 50% 
in some polls by 2012.54 Yet still, public opinion did not overwhelmingly favour same-sex 
marriage when Perry came out. 
It was Justice Kennedy’s time to dissent in Perry. Of course, said Justice Kennedy, “the 
Court must be cautious before entering a realm of controversy where the legal community and 
society at large are still formulating ideas and approaches to a most difficult subject. But it is 
shortsighted to misconstrue principles of justiciability to avoid that subject.”55 These comments 
have been read to suggest that deciding the case on justiciability grounds may have been motivated 
                                                 
48 Klarman, supra note 17 at 105 
49 Andersen, supra note 34 at 230. 
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States” (2013) 93 BUL Rev 275. 
53 Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 43. 
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by the desire “to allow popular debate over state marriage laws to continue, informed, but not 
directly controlled, by the Court’s decision on federal law in Windsor.”56 
The time, however, for the Supreme Court to step into the debate in a more decisive way 
had come by 2015. In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court granted review of four petitions 
challenging marriage exclusions for lesbian and gay couples in Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, and 
Tennessee. The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to license a marriage 
between two people of the same sex. All the opinions included references to the national 
conversation about the meaning and requirements flowing from the Constitution. The justices split 
on this issue. Justice Kennedy, writing for yet another 5-member majority, said: 
There may be an initial inclination in these cases to proceed with caution—to await 
further legislation, litigation, and debate. The respondents warn there has been 
insufficient democratic discourse before deciding an issue so basic as the definition 
of marriage . . . . Yet there has been far more deliberation than this argument 
acknowledges. There have been referenda, legislative debates, and grassroots 
campaigns, as well as countless studies, papers, books, and other popular and 
scholarly writings. There has been extensive litigation in state and federal courts.  
Judicial opinions addressing the issue have been informed by the contentions of 
parties and counsel, which, in turn, reflect the more general, societal discussion of 
same-sex marriage and its meaning that has occurred over the past decades. As 
more than 100 amici make clear in their filings, many of the central institutions in 
American life—state and local governments, the military, large and small 
businesses, labor unions, religious organizations, law enforcement, civic groups, 
professional organizations, and universities—have devoted substantial attention to 
the question.57 
 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion provided a list of these actors of constitutional interpretation and their 
contributions to an evolving debate. This debate, according to the majority, had reached a stage of 
deliberative maturity which allowed the Court to channel this conversation into constitutional law 
rules. Each of the four dissenting justices commented on this issue. The Chief Justice’s well-
crafted opinion captured the nature of their opposition: 
Nowhere is the majority’s extravagant conception of judicial supremacy more 
evident than in its description—and dismissal—of the public debate regarding 
same-sex marriage. Yes, the majority concedes, on one side are thousands of years 
of human history in every society known to have populated the planet. But on the 
other side, there has been “extensive litigation,” “many thoughtful District Court 
decisions,” “countless studies, papers, books, and other popular and scholarly 
                                                 
56 Siegel, Foreword, supra note 18 at 86. 
57 Obergefell, supra note 12 at 2605. 
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writings,” and “more than 100” amicus briefs in these cases alone. What would be 
the point of allowing the democratic process to go on? It is high time for the Court 
to decide the meaning of marriage, based on five lawyers’ “better informed 
understanding” of “a liberty that remains urgent in our own era.” The answer is 
surely there in one of those amicus briefs or studies. 
The Court’s accumulation of power does not occur in a vacuum. It comes at the 
expense of the people. And they know it. Here and abroad, people are in the midst 
of a serious and thoughtful public debate on the issue of same-sex marriage. . . . 
This deliberative process is making people take seriously questions that they may 
not have even regarded as questions before. . . . But today the Court puts a stop to 
all that.58 
  
Both sides acknowledged the national debate and identified the relevant actors. However, 
they parted company when it came to the prioritization of the different institutional forms of this 
debate with the dissenting opinions taking a narrower view and acknowledging exclusively the 
role of legislatures. Where the majority saw the Court as consolidating the conclusions of a 
polycentric debate that empowers a series of constitutional actors, the dissenting judgments saw 
the Court as stifling this debate by foreclosing the key avenue, which to them was legislative. 
 
III. Spain. 
 As was the case in other countries as well, Spain took the first, timid but necessary, step 
on the path toward recognizing same-sex relationships by repealing the law on “danger and social 
rehabilitation,” which explicitly punished male homosexuality, in 1979.59 In 1994 the 
Constitutional Court paved the way for the recognition of same-sex relationships at the regional 
level.60 In this case, the surviving partner of a same-sex cohabiting couple requested a widower’s 
pension. The Constitutional Court rejected the claim noting that “the union between two persons 
of the same sex is not a legally regulated institution, and there is no constitutional right to its 
                                                 
58 Ibid at 2624-25. 
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Palgrave Macmillan, 2018) 105 at 110. 
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establishment, unlike marriage between a man and a woman, which is a constitutional right (article 
32.1 Constitution).”61 Interestingly, the Court added:  
the full constitutionality of the heterosexual principle must be admitted as 
qualifier of the matrimonial bond . . . such that public powers can grant a 
privileged treatment to the family union of a man and a woman compared to a 
same-sex union. This does not preclude the legislator from establishing a system 
of equalization by which homosexual cohabitants can get to benefit from the full 
rights and benefits of marriage, as advocated by the European Parliament.62 
 
Since the European Parliament’s 1994 Resolution referred to “marriage or an equivalent 
legal framework,” the Spanish Constitutional Court seemed to recognize the freedom of the 
legislator to introduce same-sex marriage or registered partnerships.63 This invitation was taken 
up at the regional level before being formalized at the national level through centrally enacted 
legislation. Twelve of the seventeen autonomous communities passed same-sex partnership laws 
(registries for civil unions), with Catalonia taking the lead in 1998.64 After the 2004 general 
election, the Socialist Party came to power. The Socialist Party’s manifesto had included the 
pledge of amending the Civil Code to legalize same-sex marriage. Indeed, the Zapatero 
government introduced the bill that was passed by the Congress of Deputies in April 2005. The 
proposal, however, was rejected at the Senate and sent back to the Congress of Deputies, which 
overrode the Senate with the support of 187 votes in favour, 147 votes against, and 4 abstentions. 
Law 13/2005 was therefore approved, amending the Civil Code with respect to the right to marry. 
More specifically, Law 13/2005 added a second paragraph to Article 44 of the Civil Code, whereby 
“marriage will have the same requirements and effects when both spouses are of the same or 
different sex.”65 
This development was controversial. There were pockets of resistance from city halls, 
which claimed, unsuccessfully, “conscientious objection” to performing same-sex marriages.66 
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There was further resistance by the conservative People’s Party. The conservative “Family Forum” 
presented a proposal to repeal Law 13/2005, which was supported by the People’s Party and part 
of the Catalonian Conservative Party and was rejected in Parliament in 2007. The Conservative 
Party further used its objection to same-sex marriage law as an electoral strategy.67 During the 
2011 General Election, the People’s Party leader, Mariano Rajoy, who ended up winning the 
election, stated that he preferred the term “civil union” for same-sex couples.68 The most notable 
attack on Law 13/2005 came in the form of a constitutional challenge brought before the Spanish 
Constitutional Court by 72 members of the People’s Party Parliamentary Group in Congress. The 
resolution of the case took many years as the Constitutional Court handed down its judgment in 
November 2012.69 
 Both sides built their arguments around two provisions of the Spanish constitution, Articles 
14 (equality) and 32 (marriage). Article 14 stipulates that “Spaniards are equal before the law and 
may not in any way be discriminated against on account of birth, race, sex, religion, opinion or 
any other personal or social condition or circumstance.” Article 32 reads: 
“1. Men and women have the right to marry with full legal equality. 
2. The law shall regulate the forms of marriage, the age at which it may be entered into and the 
required capacity therefore, the rights and duties of the spouses, the grounds for separation and 
dissolution, and the consequences thereof.” 
 The petitioners’ claim on equality grounds was that, by rendering equivalent the rights held 
by couples of the same sex and couples of a different sex, Law 13/2005 was contrary to the 
principle of equality, as it ignored that marriage and couples of the same sex were different realities 
that required different treatment. The Court was not moved. It held that Article 14 of the Spanish 
Constitution did not enshrine a right to unequal treatment: “The principle of equality cannot be 
used to justify a challenge against discrimination on the grounds of non-differentiation, which 
means that we cannot condemn ‘inequality due to excess of equality.’ We are also unable to 
condemn the Law from a principle of equality perspective, due to opening the doors of marriage 
as an institution to a reality - same-sex couples - that involves specific characteristics with respect 
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to heterosexual couples.” Indeed, in the preamble of Law 13/2005, the justification for legalizing 
same-sex marriage was based on “the promotion of effective citizen equality in the free 
development of one’s personality (Articles 9.2 and 10.1 of the Spanish Constitution), the 
preservation of freedom as regards forms of co-existence (Article 1.1 of the Spanish Constitution), 
and the incorporation of a real equality framework in the enjoyment of rights, without suffering 
any discrimination on the grounds of sex, opinion or other personal or social condition (Article 14 
of the Constitution). 
Moving on to the challenge on the basis of Article 32 of the Constitution, the Spanish 
Constitutional Court reiterated the double content of this provision: marriage as an institutional 
guarantee and as a constitutional right. Under the first prong (marriage as an institutional 
guarantee), the question for the Court was whether Law 13/2005 turned marriage into an 
“unrecognizable and consequently denaturalized institution,” or whether the legislator had acted 
within the wide margin of action granted by the Constitution. The Court explained that Article 32 
only identified the holders of a right to marry, not the other spouse, although, “systematically 
speaking” it was clear that there was no intention in 1978, when Article 32 was drafted, to extend 
the exercise of this right to same-sex unions. The Court, however, began with the idea (borrowed 
from the Canadian Supreme Court) that the Constitution is a “living tree.” This invites a 
progressive interpretation that allows a constitution to adjust to the realities of modern life as 
means to guarantee its own relevance and legitimacy. In the words of the Court, “this is so not 
only because the basic principles of the constitutional text are applicable to situations not 
envisaged by its founders, but also because the public powers - and the legislator in particular - 
gradually update these principles. According to this progressive reading of the Constitution, we 
are able to build up legal culture, to the extent that the law is treated as a social phenomenon that 
is linked to the reality in which it is implemented.” 
This begs the question: was same-sex marriage integrated in the Spanish legal culture? The 
Spanish Constitutional Court looked to other legal systems (foreign law) and the decisions of 
international bodies (particularly the European Court of Human Rights) and concluded that there 
was a new “image” of marriage, gradually becoming more common though not totally standard 
yet. This new image, according to the Court, depicted marriage “from the point of view of Western 
comparative law, as a plural conception.” More interestingly for present purposes, however, the 
Court referred to official statistics in Spain. It said: “The Court cannot remain aloof from social 
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reality, as there are now quantitative data in official statistics to confirm that in Spain there is broad 
social acceptance of marriage between same-sex couples, given that these couples have gradually 
exercised their right to marry since 2005.” For example, the June 2004 barometer of the Centro de 
Investigaciones Sociológicas indicated that 66.2% of those surveyed believed that same-sex 
couples should have a right to marry. In a November-December 2010 survey, 76.8% of young 
people (14-29 years old) accepted this right.70 The Court was quick to add that all these figures are 
not determinative per se to assess the constitutionality of the law being examined. However, “they 
provide an accurate image of the extent to which marriage right holders feel identified with the 
institution that is progressively incorporating a partnership between same-sex couples.” The 
Court’s conclusion was that Law 13/2005, within the broad margin granted by Article 32 of the 
Spanish Constitution, developed the institution of marriage in accordance with Spanish legal 
culture “without making it unrecognizable for the image held of this institution in modern Spanish 
society.” 
The last inquiry for the Court was whether same-sex marriage violated the essential content 
of the fundamental right to marry under Article 32. Again, the answer was that it did not: “The 
possibility of same-sex persons entering into marriage does not denaturalize or transform this right, 
nor does it prevent heterosexual couples from freely deciding to marry or not to marry. 
Heterosexuals are not now subject to a smaller scope of freedom than was recognised to them 
before the reform.” In fact, the Court concluded, as a result of Law 13/2005, “a step forward is 
being made towards guaranteed personal dignity and the free development of one’s personality 
(Article 10.1 Constitution71), which should be directed at the full effectiveness of fundamental 
human rights.” 
The decision consolidated the recognition of same-sex marriage in Spain which now 
enjoyed the affirmation of the three branches of government. In the 2015 Eurobarometer, 84% of 
Spaniards agreed that same-sex marriage should be allowed across Europe.72 More broadly, the 
Spanish case highlights a wide range of relevant actors, all contributing to the final resolution of 
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this contested question: autonomous communities, political parties, the two chambers of the 
bicameral legislature, the Constitutional Court, foreign courts, and the people themselves. Even 
though the last point in the timeline was the Constitutional Court judgment, the Spanish case 
suggests that decentering judicial review is fruitful in revealing the full story. The process of formal 
recognition of same-sex unions began at the level of autonomous communities but, from a 
constitutional perspective, this was not the level at which equal marriage could be formally 
achieved. Therefore, in a hydraulic response, efforts for legal recognition of same-sex marriage 
had to shift to the legislature. In turn, the bicameral nature of the legislature meant that mobilization 
both to secure and to oppose same-sex marriage occurred before both chambers. Again, in a 
hydraulics fashion, when the same-sex marriage bill was first defeated in the Senate, it had to be 
sent back to the Congress of Deputies. Afterwards, when the People’s Party saw its objection in 
the Senate overridden by the Congress of Deputies, it directed its attention to the judiciary. 
 
IV. The United Kingdom.  
 The trajectory of the legalization of same-sex marriage in the UK included the usual 
milestones: from decriminalization of same-sex sexual relations to civil partnerships to formal 
legislative recognition of marriage.  
 The first stop was in 1967 when the Sexual Offences Act 1967 decriminalized private 
homosexual activity between over-21s. However, decriminalization did not mean “condonation or 
approval.”73 In fact, the increasing visibility of the gay rights movement also provoked backlash 
reflected, for instance, in the enactment of section 28 of the Local Government Act 1988 
forbidding local authorities from “intentionally promoting homosexuality” or “promoting the 
teaching . . . of the acceptability of homosexuality as a pretended family relationship.” This was 
intended to discourage local authorities from funding LGB organizations, or allowing premises to 
be used for their purposes, and to prevent state schools from presenting any view that suggested 
that gay relationships could be similar to heterosexual ones. It was repealed in 2003.74 An 
interesting feature in the story of increasing liberalization was the Adoption and Children Act 
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2002, which permitted gay couples jointly to adopt a child. As a result, opposition to same-sex 
marriage did not turn on parent-child issues.75 
Judicial involvement in this area was less pronounced in the UK. However, using its 
powers under section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA),76 the House of Lords interpreted 
domestic legislation in a way to remove incompatibilities with the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR). In the 2004 case of Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza77, the House of Lords had 
before it paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 to the Rent Act 1977, which guaranteed that the surviving 
spouse of the original tenant was entitled to succeed to the statutory tenancy after the death of the 
statutory tenant. These protections also covered the person who was living with the original tenant 
“as his or her wife or husband.” The House of Lords held that the Rent Act on its ordinary meaning 
treated survivors of homosexual partnerships less favorably than survivors of heterosexual 
partnerships without any rational or fair ground for such distinction. Consequently, Godin-
Mendoza’s rights under Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) and Article 14 
(prohibition of discrimination) of the Convention, which is incorporated into domestic law by the 
HRA, would be infringed. Therefore, section 3 of the HRA required that the legislation at issue be 
given a Convention-compliant meaning to cover same-sex stable relationships. 
 Shortly afterwards, civil partnerships were introduced in the UK through the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004. The bill passed through the House of Commons with little opposition 
securing 426 votes to 49, although there was more resistance in the House of Lords.78 Public 
opinion was supportive of civil partnerships, which proved very popular. Over 100,000 civil 
partnerships had been formed in the UK by 2011, considerably more than the government’s 
estimates when enacting the legislation.79 The introduction of civil partnerships was not the end of 
the conversation or contestation around the formal recognition of same-sex relationships. Rather, 
it prompted a new debate on whether equal access to marriage was required under the Human 
Rights Act 1998.80 One argument was that civil partnerships were not equal symbolically to 
                                                 
75 John Eekelaar, “Perceptions of Equality: The Road to Same-Sex Marriage in England and Wales” (2014) 28 Intl JL 
Pol’y & Fam 1 at 2. 
76 Section 3(1) HRA provides that “so far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation 
must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights.” 
77 [2004] UKHL 30. 
78 Eekelaar, supra note 75 at 7. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Nicholas Bamforth, “Same-sex partnerships: some comparative constitutional lessons” (2007) 1 Eur HRL Rev 47. 
 21 
marriage.81 This question confronted the judiciary and was rejected in Wilkinson v. Kitzinger82 on 
the basis that the availability of civil partnerships satisfied the requirements under Articles 8 (right 
to respect for private and family life), 12 (right to marry), and 14 (prohibition of discrimination) 
of the ECHR.  
 Formal recognition of same-sex marriage would ultimately come by means of national 
legislation. The Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, which allows same-sex marriage in 
England and Wales, was passed by the UK Parliament in July 2013 and came into force on March 
13, 2014. The Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014, allowing same-sex marriage 
in Scotland, was passed by the Scottish Parliament in February 2014 and came into effect on 
December 16, 2014. The policy had been included in neither the election manifestos of the 
Conservative Party and the Liberal Party nor in the coalition agreement of these two parties that 
formed the 2010 coalition government.83 On March 15, 2012, the government launched a 
consultation on equal civil marriage asking for views on proposals to enable same-sex couples to 
marry through a civil ceremony. The consultation period ended on June 14, 2012. The proposals 
proved highly controversial with strong opinions being voiced both for and against same-sex 
marriage. The consultation received the highest number of responses to any government 
consultation–over 228,000 comments were submitted. Certain respondents criticized the 
consultation process on the grounds that the outcome had been predetermined: the focus was on 
how to provide for same-sex marriage and not on whether it should be permitted at all. There were 
claims that the government was acting without an electoral mandate. 
Notwithstanding the strong opposition from religious groups, the Bill introducing the 
change passed by 400 to 175 votes at its second reading in the House of Commons in February 
2013 and completed its passage in the House of Commons with Labour and Liberal Democrat 
support. An attempt to reject the Bill in the House of Lords in June was defeated by 390 votes to 
148. It was enacted on July 17, 2013. There were long debates in both Houses. The second reading 
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debate took about 5 hours in the House of Commons on February 5, 2013 and even longer in the 
House of Lords on June 3 and 4.84 
However, there were few doubts that the Bill would pass. This may well have had to do 
with social attitudes by that point. A poll conducted by Populus in June 2009 reported that the 
majority of the public supported same-sex marriage: 61% of respondents agreed “strongly or 
somewhat” that “gay couples should have an equal right to get married, not just to have civil 
partnerships.”85 Table 1 reflects a similar evolution in public opinion. 
Table 1: How much do you agree or disagree that … gay or lesbian couples should have the right to marry 
one another if they want to86 
 2007 2012 2013 2014 
(1) Agree strongly  17% 24% 26% 31% 
(2) Agree  30% 33% 30% 29% 
(3) Neither agree nor disagree  20% 17% 18% 16% 
(4) Disagree  14% 12% 11% 9% 
(5) Disagree strongly  14% 10% 11% 10% 
 
 One interesting feature of the UK case was that the conventional mode of electoral 
legitimacy was not at play: same-sex marriage had not been part of an electoral manifesto so the 
claim to an electoral mandate would be tenuous at best. With the judicial and electoral avenues 
closed, in a hydraulics fashion, the government’s response to the mobilization of equal marriage 
advocates was to infuse popular legitimacy into the process through an energized public 
consultation and hearings at the committee stage of the legislative process. This built on an eight-
year long debate around civil partnerships and the visibility of officially sanctioned same-sex 
relationships. The public consultation process was open to everyone and involved both advocates 
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for same-sex marriage and their opponents. Admittedly, the public debate was narrowed both 
through the formulation of the consultation question and due to the absence of a public reading 
stage which could have been built into the legislative process. The process of “public reading” had 
been piloted for other bills and would have been aptly applicable in the context of same-sex 
marriage as well.87 This additional process, if integrated fully into the legislative process,88 would 
have allowed for more specific public involvement in drafting the legislative language and 
addressed the inherent limitations of the committee stage. In any event, the UK example represents 
a model of public involvement that was superimposed on the legislative process potentially to 
address any legitimacy lacunae in the conventional electoral mandate model. 
 The UK model offers a further example of hydraulics in operation that shape and steer 
constitutional claims within the different nations of the country–I call this phenomenon the 
“hydraulics of devolution.” Marriage is a devolved issue in the UK. As already noted, the statutory 
recognition of same-sex marriage in England and Wales was followed by a similar enactment in 
Scotland a year later. Against the backdrop of the devolved constitutional architecture of the UK, 
these developments turned the spotlight on Northern Ireland, which has not legalized same-sex 
marriage. Northern Ireland’s parliamentary system provided for the mechanism of “petitions of 
concern”; these triggered the requirement for support of a majority of both nationalist and unionist 
members for legislation to pass even if there was an absolute majority in favour of the enactment. 
Consequently, this mechanism allowed for an effective veto of legislation. The Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP) used this mechanism five times to block same-sex marriage despite majority 
support in the legislative assembly since 2015 and strong support among Northern Ireland’s 
citizens.89 Under Schedule 2 of the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, a marriage of a same-
sex couple under the law of England and Wales is to be treated in Northern Ireland as a civil 
partnership formed under the Civil Partnership Act 2004. 
                                                 
87 On the public reading stage of the UK legislative process, see House of Commons Library, “Public Reading Stage 
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89 See Siobhan Fenton,  “My love isn't second-class”: the struggle for marriage equality in Northern Ireland, The 
Guardian (October 19, 2017), available at https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/2017/oct/19/my-love-isnt-second-
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 This asymmetry has singled out Northern Ireland as an outlier and sustained a continued 
national conversation on the question of same-sex marriage, adding ammunition to both sides of 
the debate: arguments can be made both that this jurisdiction should be brought in line or that it is 
precisely the historical, political, and cultural particularities in Northern Ireland which call for a 
different solution from that adopted in the rest of the UK. Since the Northern Ireland Assembly 
was unable to resolve this question and consequently the legislative avenue was closed, equal 
marriage advocates redirected their constitutional claims against the status quo in Northern Ireland 
into the court system. 
 In Close,90 two same-sex couples who had entered into civil partnerships in 2005, brought 
a judicial review challenge against Article 6 of the Marriage (NI) Order 2003 (“2003 Order”) 
which prohibits same-sex marriage. They argued that the 2003 Order unlawfully discriminated 
against them on the basis of sexual orientation contrary to the Human Rights Act 1998 and Article 
8 (right to respect for private and family life), Article 12 (right to marry), and Article 14 
(prohibition of discrimination) of the ECHR. The High Court (O’Hara J) began by noting: “The 
personal experiences of the applicants are described in moving terms in the affidavits lodged on 
their behalf. Their distress and feeling of exclusion has only increased in recent years as same sex 
marriage has been introduced through legislation in England, Wales and Scotland, as a result of a 
referendum in the Republic of Ireland and as a result of decisions taken by legislatures and courts 
in a growing number of countries.”91 In other words, devolution and foreign law turned the 
spotlight on the real effects of discrimination as experienced by same-sex couples in Northern 
Ireland. 
 However, this did not suffice for the judicial review application to be successful. Referring 
to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the High Court of Northern Ireland 
reiterated that the ECHR does not impose an obligation on states to introduce same-sex marriage 
but only some form of legal recognition of same-sex relationships. This recognition already existed 
in Northern Ireland through civil partnerships and therefore the Convention rights of the applicants 
had not been violated. O’Hara J. concluded:  
It is not the role of a judge to decide on social policy. That is for the Executive 
and the Assembly under our constitution. In certain limited circumstances the 
courts can intervene but this is not one of them. Put simply, the Strasbourg Court 
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does not recognise a ‘right’ to same sex marriage. . . . If equality in marriage is 
to be achieved for gay and lesbian couples such as these applicants, it will have 
to be achieved through the Assembly. I hope that when the Assembly is next 
asked to consider the issue, those who have the responsibility of voting will read 
the evidence in this case and in Re X in order to understand more completely the 
issue before them.92  
It is interesting that the court recognized the dynamics of devolution and sought to speak to the 
Northern Ireland Assembly while referring the question back to it. 
 Re X,93 which was mentioned in the last paragraph of Close and was decided again by 
O’Hara J. on the same day as Close, added a layer of complication. This was that in Re X, X had 
lawfully married his partner in London under the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 but the 
law of Northern Ireland, where they lived, did not recognize their relationship as a valid and 
subsisting marriage but only as a civil partnership under Schedule 2 of the 2013 Act cited earlier 
in this section. The petitioner argued that, if this provision of the 2013 Act could not be read and 
given effect to in a way which was compatible with his ECHR rights (under section 3 of the Human 
Rights Act 1998), the court should issue a declaration of incompatibility (under section 4 of the 
Human Rights Act 1998). Demonstrating once again the “hydraulics of devolution,” the petitioner 
argued that “no attempt has been made to justify on tenable grounds the policy decision not to 
legislate for same sex marriage in Northern Ireland” and the fact that the Scottish Parliament had 
also legislated for same-sex marriage made “the impasse in Northern Ireland even harder to sustain 
and justify.”94 Devolution provided argumentative force to X’s submissions95 but ultimately the 
judicial challenge was not successful for the reasons advanced in Close as well, namely that the 
ECHR did not provide a right to same-sex marriage. 
Once again, the High Court of Northern Ireland demonstrated an appreciation of the 
national conversation around these questions noting that “the social policy arguments in favour of 
same sex marriage were set out in very strong terms during the consultation process which led up 
to the 2013 Act and during the Parliamentary debates” and concluding “with the suggestion that 
when this issue is raised again in the Northern Ireland Assembly, as it inevitably will be, those 
who carry the responsibility of voting will pause to read the papers from the consultation 
                                                 
92 Ibid at paras 16-17. 
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process.”96 However, this did not make any concrete difference for the petitioner. Anthony Lester 
has criticized Re X because it “asked and answered the wrong question.” He has highlighted that 
Re X, unlike Close, was “not about the statutory barrier against same sex marriage in Northern 
Ireland [but] about the refusal in Northern Ireland to respect a same sex marriage lawfully entered 
into in England. The Northern Ireland judge and the Strasbourg Court have not pronounced on that 
question and there are strong arguments in X’s favour for concluding that the refusal to recognise 
an English marriage in Northern Ireland is incompatible with Convention rights.”97 
The High Court of Northern Ireland has opened a new round in the national conversation 
on same-sex marriage in the UK which is invigorated by the country’s devolved constitutional 
architecture. These cases are currently before the Court of Appeal, but the conversation will 
continue outside the courthouse both in Stormont, the seat of the Northern Ireland Assembly, and 
in London.98 More recently, in yet another instance of the “hydraulic process” and in light of the 
legislative impasse at Stormont and the unsuccessful litigation in Northern Ireland courts, the 
efforts for equal marriage were shifted back to the Westminster Parliament. On March 27, 2018, 
Lord Hayward, a conservative peer introduced a private member’s bill “to make provision for the 
marriage of same sex couples in Northern Ireland.”99 The bill passed its first reading.100 The 
following day, a Labour MP, Conor McGinn, tabled an identical bill in the House of Commons. 
The second reading debate had been originally scheduled for May 11, 2018. However, the bill was 
objected to and second reading is currently scheduled for October 26, 2018.101 Regardless of the 
outcome, it was evident that the “hydraulics of devolution” was driving this legislative initiative 
in the Westminster Parliament. Introducing the bill, Conor McGinn MP noted his pride in bringing 
the bill but also his “reluctance and disappointment” for two reasons: “First, this measure is long 
overdue. Northern Ireland is the anomaly in these islands when it comes to lesbian, gay, bisexual 
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and transgender rights. . . . Secondly, this measure should be enacted in the Northern Ireland 
Assembly. Let me say clearly that that is my strong preference. I know that Members across the 
House desperately want to see the power-sharing institutions restored at Stormont. However, the 
Assembly being in cold storage should not mean that Northern Ireland remains a cold house for 
LGBT rights. The de facto suspension of the devolved legislature does not mean that equality for 
same-sex couples can be suspended indefinitely, because rights delayed are rights denied.”102 
 
V. Ireland. 
 If Northern Ireland brings to the fore the mechanics of devolution, the Republic of Ireland 
presents a different institutional novelty, direct citizen involvement in constitutional change 
through referendums. Indeed, citizen involvement is considered of utmost importance when it 
comes to changes in the fundamental law in the country, namely constitutional amendments.103 
The requirement of citizen involvement in amending the Irish Constitution, though solely at the 
invitation of Parliament (Oireachtas), has been described as a “notable feature” of the 
Constitution.104 The legalization of same-sex marriage via referendum makes Ireland stand out as, 
until that point, direct citizen involvement in popular initiatives had mostly resulted in defeats for 
the cause of same-sex marriage. However, Ireland is not an outlier when it comes to the operation 
of the hydraulics dynamics described earlier: the decision was put to a referendum because the 
legislative and judicial avenues were not (or were perceived not to be) available.  
 The first step on the road to legalizing same-sex marriage was the decriminalization of 
private, consensual sexual activity between adults of the same sex. In 1988, the European Court of 
Human Rights held that provisions in the Offences against the Person Act, 1861 and the Criminal 
Law Amendment Act, 1885, which penalized “certain homosexual activities,” violated the right to 
respect for private life (including sexual life) under Article 8 of the ECHR.105 Decriminalization 
took effect through domestic legislation five years later.106 However, courts had consistently held 
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that the definition of marriage involved a man and a woman.107 In 2004, the Civil Registration Act 
2004 codified the common law prohibition of same-sex marriage.108 This 2004 Act was enacted to 
modernize the procedures for registering births, deaths, adoptions, and marriages. Section 2(2)(e) 
stated: “For the purposes of this Act there is an impediment to a marriage if . . . both parties are of 
the same sex.”  
 This provision lent support to the holding in the 2006 Zappone case109 which, in conjunction 
with other case law, may have contributed to the path of a constitutional referendum in Ireland. In 
Zappone, a same-sex couple, who had married in Vancouver in 2003, requested that they be 
recognized as a married couple for the purposes of the Irish Tax Code. The High Court rejected 
their claims, holding that neither Article 41 of the Irish Constitution, which protects the family and 
the “institution of marriage,”110 nor the European Convention on Human Rights recognized the 
right to same-sex marriage. The High Court began by noting that the framers of the Irish 
Constitution accepted the “traditional understanding” of marriage.111 However, the Court also 
accepted that the Constitution is a “living instrument”112 endorsing an earlier case in which Walsh 
J. had stated that “no interpretation of the Constitution is intended to be final for all time. It is given 
in the light of prevailing ideas and concepts.”113 This raised the question of the basis on which the 
court is to interpret or ascertain the “prevailing ideas and concepts.” 
 Adopting this approach, the High Court held that it could not “redefine” marriage to cover 
same-sex couples. It continued that there was “little evidence” of a “changing consensus” around 
same-sex marriage with “some limited support” in Canada, Massachusetts, South Africa, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, and Spain. However, “in truth, it is difficult to see that as a consensus, changing 
or otherwise.”114 By contrast, the High Court noted that section 2(2)(e) of the Civil Registration 
Act 2004, which set out what was previously the common law exclusion of same-sex couples from 
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the institution of marriage, was “of itself an indication of the prevailing idea and concept in relation 
to what marriage is and how it should be defined.” Since the 2004 Act was in force, it was entitled 
to a “presumption of constitutionality.”115 
 The High Court’s deference to the approach to marriage reflected in section 2(2)(e) of the 
Civil Registration Act 2004 was criticized: this section had never been properly debated by 
Parliament prior to its enactment, thus casting doubt on the assertion that the provision represented 
the “prevailing legislative view” on the understanding of marriage.116 Zappone also gave rise to 
opposing views as to the relationship between ordinary legislation and the Irish Constitution on 
the question of same-sex marriage. If Article 41 of the Constitution does not mandate the 
recognition of same-sex marriage, does it prohibit such recognition? While the historical reading 
of the Constitution would suggest that only opposite-sex marriage is contemplated, if “the key 
factor was consensus in society today, as represented in the most recent legislation on the point,” 
then Parliament could arguably choose to reflect a “new consensus” by legislating for same-sex 
marriage.117 Like the Civil Registration Act 2004, the statute introducing same-sex marriage would 
then be entitled to a presumption of constitutionality. However, this conclusion was far from 
certain. Indeed, key political actors stated publicly their understanding that legalization of same-
sex marriage through ordinary legislation could be on constitutionally shaky ground.118 
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 This constitutional interpretation did not pose any obstacles to the introduction of civil 
partnerships by ordinary legislation in 2010.119 However, it did influence how Ireland came to 
recognize same-sex marriage five years later. With courts refusing to read Article 41 of the Irish 
Constitution as mandating same-sex marriage, with key political actors considering the ordinary 
legislative avenue closed or strategically avoiding testing out their understanding of the 
Constitution,120 and with members of the LGBT movement being cautious about pushing for 
recognition in the legislature with the risk of seeing this overturned by the Supreme Court, the only 
available route was constitutional amendment.121 
 The coalition government of Fine Gael and the Labour party, which came to power in 2011, 
set this process in motion. A resolution of the two Houses of Parliament set up a special 
Constitutional Convention to discuss amendments to the Constitution of Ireland, including same-
sex marriage. The Constitutional Convention consisted of 100 members: 66 citizens selected 
randomly so as to be broadly representative of Irish society; 33 parliamentarians (29 members of 
the Oireachtas and 4 from the Northern Ireland Assembly); and an independent Chairperson 
appointed by the government.122 The Constitutional Convention was described as “a major 
experiment in deliberative democracy” involving for the first time in Irish history a process of 
deliberation among ordinary citizens in the lead-up to a referendum.123  On April 13-14, 2013, the 
members of the Convention considered a record number of submissions (1077) by citizens, 
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advocacy groups, and representative organizations; attended presentations by experts in law and 
social science (family therapy/ psychology) as well as by advocacy groups; participated in 
roundtable discussions and plenary sessions on the themes emerging from the roundtable 
discussions; and finally voted by a majority of 79% in favour of amending the Constitution to 
provide for same-sex marriage.124 In the referendum that took place on May 22, 2015, with a 
turnout of 60.5%, a 20-year record in the history of Irish referendums until that point, 62% of the 
electorate approved the proposed amendment.125 The 34th Amendment to the Irish Constitution 
provides that “marriage may be contracted in accordance with law by two persons without 
distinction as to their sex.”126 
 Putting the question of same-sex unions to a popular vote was not novel127 although the 
constitutionalization of equal marriage via referendum was a first worldwide. The institutional 
dynamics that favoured this institutional route were similarly not novel. The bottom-up demands 
for recognition of same-sex marriage were first channeled through the usual judicial and legislative 
avenues. When these avenues appeared closed to these constitutional claims, these demands were 
diverted to the constitutional route. The familiar “hydraulics model” was in operation in Ireland as 
well. In light of the country’s background constitutional structure, the “constitutional route” 
mandated direct citizen involvement through a referendum.  
 It was this institutional particularity of the Irish case that made it controversial. There were 
two broad lines of criticism–I will call them the “democracy argument” and the “liberal argument.” 
The “democracy argument” decries the “over-constitutionalization” of politics: “it is often argued 
that the fact of the ‘people’ having the final say on important social questions, such as the meaning 
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of marriage, is a sign of democratic vitality. Yet the reluctance of our parliament to independently 
appraise equal marriage rights – in marked contrast to our neighbours – is, at one level, simply a 
further sign of dysfunction in our parliamentary democracy, a negation of political choice.”128 The 
“liberal argument” cautions against putting the equal rights of citizens to a popular vote  where 
constitutionally impermissible motives (or “animus,” to use a term from US case law) may be 
covered by the secrecy of the voting booth.129 The outcome of the Irish referendum may have been 
positive, the argument would go, but this had not been the past and may well not be the future of 
popular initiatives.  
 Both of these concerns are valid but should be contextualized in the Irish case. The 
referendum had been preceded by deliberation in the Constitutional Convention. In a recent study, 
awareness of the Convention, which was the case in 46% of the sample, was positively correlated 
with a “Yes” vote to legalization of same-sex marriage. While there was “no discernible impact 
on the likelihood of turning out to vote,” the study suggests that “the involvement of the 
Convention in the establishment of the referendum has had an impact on the deliberative nature of 
the referendum in the wider community.”130 This observation should be combined with the high 
visibility media campaign and extensive canvassing efforts which resulted in a record-setting 
turnout.131 The referendum was a “major political event [that helped] establish the Constitution as 
an active site for debates about society’s values and principles”132 when the legislative and judicial 
sites of constitutional contestation favoured the status quo and meant that democratic 
constitutionalism could take the form of neither political nor legal constitutionalism per se. 
 
VI. Conclusion: Comparative and normative lessons. 
What is to be learned from these maps of the multiple actors raising, and resolving, 
constitutional claims? It had already been pointed out in the literature that we should not be quick 
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to associate controversies over same-sex relationships with “bold judicial pronouncements on 
constitutional rights [since] much of the worldwide progress for same-sex relationship recognition 
has occurred at the legislative level, often without overt prompting from courts.”133 This 
conclusion is important and correct but should not lead to an oversimplification of the role of actors 
beyond the courts. The conventional account of judicialization should not be replaced by the 
alternative conventional account of legislative supremacy. 
Instead, this article argues that both accounts have explanatory value to the extent that they 
turn the spotlight on key actors (courts or legislatures) without, however, obscuring the role of 
other stakeholders who seek and play a role in the development of constitutional law in different 
countries. We have seen, for instance, that decentralization arrangements empower a set of local 
actors. This is especially salient in the US example where the social movement strategy for equal 
marriage (up until Perry) had been to target state legislatures and state courts. There was a parallel 
process in Spain where autonomous communities took the lead in establishing civil unions. Of 
course, the different institutional frameworks shape the role of these actors: for example, the 
Spanish Constitution stipulates that autonomous communities cannot regulate civil marriage (Art. 
149.1.viii). This accounts for the form of official recognition of same-sex relationships as civil 
unions. In an analogous fashion, marriage is a devolved issue in the UK. Recognition of same-sex 
marriage in England and Wales was followed by a similar legislative move in Scotland and new 
rounds of litigation in Northern Ireland which remained an outlier by not following the pattern of 
statutory legalization.  
Either way, the debate in one jurisdiction is enriched thanks to developments in other 
jurisdictions within a country. All these sub-national (or decentralized) developments contributed 
to the national conversation and added impetus to the process of generalizing same-sex marriage 
nationally. The US Supreme Court declined to intervene to legalize same-sex marriage across the 
nation in 2013 but did so in 2015 on the basis of wider agreement at the state level. In other words, 
the process was not as court-driven as the standard account may suggest. Conversely, in Spain the 
last word was neither the legislature’s nor the Constitutional Court’s but rather shared through an 
inter-institutional consensus. The Constitutional Court judgment came in last, but the institutional 
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setting was significant: the Court did not legalize same-sex marriage itself but recognized the 
margin of legislative judgment, which the legislature had exercised in accordance with 
constitutional principles. It would be difficult to imagine a different outcome when significant 
majorities in the autonomous communities, the legislature, and the public were moving in the same 
direction. Last, in all the country cases, the national conversation around these issues will continue 
in terms of reconciling advances in LGBT rights with claims made on the basis of other individual 
rights, notably freedom of conscience, religion, and expression.134 In an interesting inversion, 
former majorities employ the language of individual rights to seek accommodation.135 
This analysis should not be taken to suggest that variations in the institutional, historical, 
political, and social contexts do not matter. They do, among other reasons, because they help to 
explain the different institutional forms that the voices of multiple actors take. Even though 
institutional and procedural forms vary, the case studies demonstrate that the same overarching 
hydraulic processes are at play across jurisdictions. This is the common underlying mechanism 
that prompts and sustains constitutional evolution. When social movements are shut out of one 
forum, they channel their constitutional claims through other institutional avenues.136 For instance, 
when pro-LGBT advocates faced the silence or hostility of legislators in the US, they steered their 
energy toward courts (state courts first, federal courts at later stages). When the conservative 
People’s Party in Spain saw its objection in the Senate overridden by the Congress of Deputies, 
members of the party directed their attention to the judiciary. When judicial avenues were blocked 
and political campaigns not utilized in the UK, the voices of different actors were brought in 
through unprecedented involvement in a public consultation process. When neither the ordinary 
legislative nor the judicial avenues appeared as fruitful options in Ireland, the same bottom-up 
                                                 
134 See, e.g., the interesting and difficult cases of “gay wedding cakes” that reached the US and UK Supreme Courts: 
Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, Docket 16-111 and Lee v Ashers Baking Company, 
UKSC 2017/0020, respectively. The US Supreme Court handed down its judgment on June 4, 2018 (584 U. S. ____ 
(2018)). 
135 See Reva Siegel, “The constitutionalization of abortion”, in M. Rosenfeld and A. Sajó, eds, The Oxford Handbook 
of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 1057 at 1077 (noting that “rhetorical 
inversions of this kind may emerge as movements employ the discourse of a reigning constitutional order in order to 
challenge it”). 
136 The “hydraulics process” proposed in the text as a key explanatory factor for constitutional evolution are not a new 
phenomenon. For an example from the 19th century, see Kent Roach, “The Judicial, Legislative and Executive Roles 
in Enforcing the Constitution: Three Manitoba Stories”, in Richard Albert & David R. Cameron, eds, Canada in the 
World: Comparative Perspectives on the Canadian Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017) 264 
at 300 (“The Manitoba minorities made their rights claims to the executive, the legislature and the courts. They 
asserted their rights to anyone who would listen”). 
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constitutional claims were transformed into Constitutional amendment claims in the course of a 
referendum campaign that altered the Irish Constitution.  
Furthermore, the focus in this article is not on how bottom-up demands around specific 
issues are generated in the first place or on the detailed conditions of success—for example, 
through the politics of visibility in the context of LGBT rights.137 Rather, the historical 
institutionalist approach applied in this article sheds light on how bottom-up demands for same-
sex marriage responded to hydraulic processes and were thus channeled institutionally in diverse 
ways in countries with different constitutional structures. Of course, institutional positions and 
policy milestones contribute or feed back into the cultural, political, and social forces that sustain 
and invigorate grassroots mobilization. Indeed, the analysis in this article has pointed to such 
instances, namely the role of institutions as part of the legal and political culture and as important 
participants in national conversations around same-sex marriage. From this perspective, this article 
is in conversation with earlier scholarship on “legal opportunity structure” (LOS), which has 
highlighted that legal reform is “contingent on the interaction of a variety of institutional, cultural, 
and strategic factors.”138 The LOS framework suggests that social movements advocating legal 
change are constrained by the availability of both “cultural” and “legal stock.” The latter means 
that societal actors must structure their claims to correspond with “categories previously 
established by an amalgam of constitutional, statutory, administrative, common, and case law.”139 
This analysis further suggests that while litigation creates “moments of opportunity” for legal 
reform, these are “bounded by the specific legal and political context.”140 Consequently, “similar 
legal decisions occurring in different [countries] may create dissimilar opportunities for action 
because of differences in each [country’s] LOS.”141 The focus in this article has been on the 
institutional side of this story, on the institutional dynamics that explain why the recognition of 
same-sex marriage took the particular institutional forms and how these forms channel democratic 
demands for constitutional evolution. 
                                                 
137 For a recent, interesting account on this point, see Phillip M. Ayoub, When States Come Out: Europe's Sexual 
Minorities and the Politics of Visibility (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
138 Andersen, supra note 34 at 200, 8 ff. 
139 Ibid at 12. 
140 Ibid at 15. 
141 Ibid at 176. This argument is made in the context of different states within the United States but can easily be 
transferred to apply to different countries. 
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Two concluding observations are in order. The main argument in this article is analytical 
and explanatory. The previous pages have provided a comparative account of institutional 
interactions and forms of citizen engagement in the process of advancing constitutional claims. 
These processes respond to similar forces—that is, common functional demands for democratic 
involvement in shaping constitutional meaning which, in turn, are shaped by the “hydraulic 
processes” described earlier.  In other words, the case studies have demonstrated how the interface 
between common bottom-up demands and the same overarching hydraulic process on the one hand 
and different institutional contexts and background structures on the other generated different 
modalities of recognizing same sex-marriage. Therefore, despite important variations across 
jurisdictions owing to fundamental legal and contextual differences, the story is ultimately one of 
constitutional development arising from a multiplicity of constitutional actors. This analytical 
framework can be applied to other case studies.142 For instance, still in the context of same-sex 
marriage but in another country, Christine Bateup has offered a “positive, society-wide account of 
dialogue” in Canada arguing that “[n]ot only have judicial decisions acted as the catalyst for 
widespread political and popular debate on the issue of same-sex marriage, but the bold moves of 
the judiciary in this area appear to be connected to emerging popular support.”143 More recently, 
Brenda Cossman has offered a rich story of same-sex marriage in Canada that moves beyond the 
“simplistic dichotomies . . . pitting courts against legislatures.” Cossman’s account sheds light on 
the deep divisions and contestation within the Canadian federal government over the question of 
same-sex marriage, and on the use of court decisions by proponents of equal marriage to convince 
both cabinet colleagues and the public.144 
Moreover, the story told in this article is an invitation for further research applying this 
framework to other constitutional rights claims, such as trans rights or abortion.145 One recent 
                                                 
142 At the time of this writing, twenty-seven jurisdictions around the world have recognized same-sex marriage (Pew 
Research Center, “Gay Marriage Around the World” (August 8, 2017), available at 
http://www.pewforum.org/2017/08/08/gay-marriage-around-the-world-2013/). The paradigm proposed in this article 
is an invitation for further scholarship examining the complex historical, institutional, and cultural contexts that, in 
conjunction with “hydraulic processes,” have shaped the forms of same-sex marriage recognition in other countries 
over the past two decades. 
143 Christine Bateup “Expanding the Conversation: American and Canadian Experiences of Constitutional Dialogue 
in Comparative Perspective” (2007) 21 Temple Int’l & Comp LJ 1 at 47. This account is developed further ibid at 47-
56. 
144 Brenda Cossman, “Same Sex Marriage beyond Charter Dialogue: Charter Cases and Contestation within 
Government” (forthcoming in UTLJ). I wish to thank Brenda Cossman for sharing her manuscript with me. 
145 See, e.g., the special volume on “Transfiguring Justice: Trans People and the Law” in the University of Toronto 
Law Journal (vol. 68(1)), especially Florence Ashley, “Don’t be so hateful: The insufficiency of anti-discrimination 
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development is presented here by way of example. Several themes discussed in this article emerged 
again in a recent UK Supreme Court decision on abortion in Northern Ireland.146  Under sections 
58-59 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 and section 25(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 
(Northern Ireland) 1945, it is a criminal offence to receive or perform an abortion in Northern 
Ireland except when the abortion is carried out in good faith to preserve the life of the woman, or 
where continuing the pregnancy would make her a “physical or mental wreck.”147 The Northern 
Ireland Human Rights Commission (NIHRC) challenged the compatibility of the law in Northern 
Ireland with Articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), insofar as 
this law prohibits abortion in cases of fatal and other foetal abnormality, rape, and incest. On the 
substantive compatibility issues, a majority of the UK Supreme Court held that the current law is 
incompatible with the right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 of the ECHR, 
insofar as it prohibits abortion in cases of rape, incest, and fatal foetal abnormality. However, a 
majority of the Court also concluded that the NIHRC did not have standing to bring these 
proceedings and accordingly that the Court did not have jurisdiction to make a declaration of 
incompatibility in this case under s. 4 HRA. 
Interestingly for present purposes, the majority inserted the voice of the public into the 
judgment by referring to opinion polls which had been submitted by the NIHRC. These surveys 
demonstrated strong public support for changes in the law to permit abortion in cases of rape, 
incest, and fatal foetal abnormality.148 Even so, Lord Mance continued: “Views elicited by opinion 
polls cannot by themselves prevail over the decision to date by the Northern Ireland Assembly to 
maintain, at least for the present, the existing policy and law.”149 However, other members of the 
Court noted that “this evidence cannot be lightly dismissed when the argument is that profound 
                                                 
and hate crime laws in improving trans well-being” (2008) 68 UTLJ 1; Brenda Cossman, “Gender identity, gender 
pronouns, and freedom of expression: Bill C-16 and the traction of specious legal claims” (2008) 68 UTLJ 37; Kyle 
Kirkup “The origins of gender identity and gender expression in Anglo-American legal discourse” (2008) 68 UTLJ 
80. On abortion, the enactment of the Eighth Amendment to the Irish Constitution in 1983 and its repeal in May 2018 
would be a fruitful example to explore the application of this model; see, e.g., Fiona de Londras & Mairead Enright, 
Repealing the 8th: Reforming Irish abortion law (Bristol: Policy Press, 2018). As noted previously, on May 25, 2018, 
66.4% of the Irish electorate voted to repeal the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. 
146 Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s Application for Judicial Review [2018] UKSC 27. 
147 This is the “Bourne exception” following R v Bourne [1939] 1 KB 687. 
148 Ibid at para 110 (Lord Mance). 
149 Ibid at para 111. 
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moral views of the public are sufficient to outweigh the grave interference with the rights of the 
pregnant women entailed in making them continue their pregnancies to term.”150 
 Recalling themes that we encountered in the context of same-sex marriage in Northern 
Ireland, the UK Supreme Court further noted that, in the case of criminalizing abortion, once again 
Northern Ireland was an outlier compared to both the rest of the United Kingdom and the Republic 
of Ireland: 
Northern Ireland is . . . almost alone in the strictness of its current law, with 
Ireland’s even stricter regime having been reconsidered in the referendum held 
on 25 May 2018, in which the people of that country voted by a large majority 
(66.4%) to replace the Eighth Amendment of the Irish Constitution . . . . None 
of this of course means axiomatically that the Northern Irish position may not 
be justifiable. The margin of appreciation has its domestic homologue in the 
respect due to “the decisions of a representative legislature” . . . . But the close 
ties between the different parts and peoples of the United Kingdom make it 
appropriate to examine the justification for the differences in this area with care. 
One might think that this would also apply as between peoples living and able 
freely to interchange with each other on the same island.151 
  
Just as in Close, which as discussed in Part IV involved a challenge against the prohibition 
of same-sex marriage in Northern Ireland, devolution and foreign law turned the spotlight on the 
real effects of discrimination as experienced by same-sex couples in Northern Ireland, devolution 
and foreign law in this context turned the spotlight on the real effects of the abortion law and 
“ongoing suffering being caused by it”152 as experienced by women in Northern Ireland. This is 
one example in which the analytical framework proposed in this article has broader implications 
beyond the marriage context and invites future studies to tell more complex stories in other 
domains. 
Last, this analytical framework can also lay the groundwork to engage in broader normative 
debates on constitutional development.153 These normative questions cannot be treated 
                                                 
150 Ibid at para 24 (Lady Hale). In a similar vein, Lord Kerr (with whom Lord Wilson agreed) stated that “at the least, 
[the surveys] served to cast substantial doubt on the claim … that opposition to the change in the law is firmly 
embedded in the minds and attitudes of the people of Northern Ireland” (ibid at para 325). 
151 Ibid at para 120 (Lord Mance) (emphasis added). 
152 Ibid at para 135 (Lord Mance). 
153 In an earlier article, Barry Friedman had stressed the descriptive nature of the account of constitutionalism he 
proposed while also recognizing that it was not always possible to bracket the normative questions; see Barry 
Friedman, “Dialogue and Judicial Review” (1997) 91 Mich L Rev 577 at 580 (noting that the goal of his article “was 
to redescribe the landscape of American constitutionalism in a manner vastly different than most normative 
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exhaustively in the context of this article; however, the preceding analysis can contribute, to evoke 
the familiar image from an earlier section, to the ongoing conversation in constitutional theory 
about the appropriate role of different institutions. From a normative perspective, our starting point 
should be neither political nor legal constitutionalism but instead democratic constitutionalism. 
The focus on democratic constitutionalism reflects a normative commitment to inclusive 
interpretive communities, which include both elite actors but also grassroots movements that test 
their claims through every possible institutional avenue drawing on a broader public debate that 
occurs outside the courthouses and the legislatures.154 This emphasis on inclusive, public, and 
inter-institutional conversation facilitates a dynamic and sustainable interpretation of 
constitutional principles that reflects bottom-up constitutional evolution rather than top-down 
delivery of constitutional meaning. 
In other words, democratic constitutionalism is the fundamental normative commitment 
and the main driving force for the recognition of constitutional claims. This article has suggested 
that democratic constitutionalism can take multiple forms as it operates within the institutional 
environment and constraints of each jurisdiction and is shaped by hydraulic processes. In turn, 
these various forms may have been captured by the conventional labels of legal or political 
constitutionalism, but this should not be a simple binary choice. The US model of legal 
constitutionalism reflected in Obergefell was, in fact, the culmination of a national conversation 
involving multiple actors at all levels of government as well as grassroots mobilization (and 
counter-mobilization) which shaped judicial reasoning and outcomes. In Spain, neither legal nor 
                                                 
scholarship. At times this article slips across the line into prescription, but by and large the task is descriptive. The 
idea is to clear the way so that later normative work can proceed against the backdrop of a far more accurate 
understanding of the system of American constitutionalism”). 
154 Beginning with the idea that “adjudication is interpretation,” Owen Fiss has linked the notion of an “interpretive 
community” to authority: “authority can only be conferred by a community. Accordingly, the disciplining rules that 
govern an interpretive activity must be seen as defining or demarcating an interpretive community consisting of those 
who recognize the rules as authoritative” (Owen M. Fiss, “Objectivity and Interpretation” (1982) 34 Stan L Rev 739 
at 745). However, Harold McDougall has noted that Fiss’s delineation of an “interpretive community” is exclusive as 
it covers only an elite group of lawyers and judges who wield state power (Harold A. McDougall, “Social Movements, 
Law, and Implementation: A Clinical Dimension for the New Legal Process” (1989) 75 Cornell L Rev 83 at 100, 110). 
McDougall advances instead the idea of an “implementive community,” which he defines as a “system-oriented 
leadership group, sprung from an interpretive community, which seeks to advance the social causes of the community 
by resort to the legal system, including the courts, legislature, and administrative bureaucracy” (ibid at 85n.10). 
McDougall’s broader definition is consistent with the approach in this article. Indeed, he recognizes the idea of 
institutional multiplicity noting that the actors in the dialogue around civil rights “have extended far beyond the three 
principal branches of the federal government. Policy-making agencies and officials of government-federal, state, and 
local-may be called upon to implement federal civil rights law, both by official pronouncement and by force of 
example. . . . Private participants of various stripes, including corporate executives, labor union officials, and school 
administrators, join the public actors” (ibid at 120). 
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political constitutionalism can describe accurately the process of inter-institutional consensus that 
drew on the evolving legal culture, which in turn reflected domestic public opinion, “Western 
comparative law,” and previous initiatives in the autonomous communities. In the UK, the label 
of political constitutionalism might appear to have intuitive appeal but should not sideline the 
direct public involvement and the “hydraulics of devolution” discussed in Part IV. In Ireland, 
neither the ordinary legislative nor the judicial avenues were available. Therefore, democratic 
constitutionalism took the form of neither political nor legal constitutionalism per se. Instead, 
bottom-up constitutional claims were transformed into Constitutional amendment claims which 
involved the people directly in the course of the referendum campaign but also in the Constitutional 
Convention. 
In conclusion, adopting democratic constitutionalism as our starting point allows flexibility 
in approaching a range of different jurisdictions with a view to tracing how different institutional 
configurations bring in the voices of multiple constitutional actors, including notably the people 
themselves. Analytically, this framework captures more accurately the complex institutional 
dynamics across various legal systems; these institutional dynamics are generated by hydraulics 
processes that prompt societal actors to shift between different institutional settings to advance 
their constitutional claims. Normatively, this framework encourages inclusive and dynamic 
constitutional interpretation that reflects evolving political and social demands instead of top-down 
constitutional development. 
